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Luty: In the Matter of Mitigation: The Necessity of a Less Discretionar

NOTE
IN THE MATTER OF MITIGATION: THE
NECESSITY OF A LESS DISCRETIONARY

STANDARD FOR SANCTIONING LAWYERS
FOUND GUILTY OF INTENTIONALLY

MISAPPROPRIATING CLIENT PROPERTY
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 31, 2002, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the case of
one Caesar M. Harris, an attorney found guilty of intentionally
misappropriating over $29,000 of alimony payment intended to go to his
client.' The question before the court was related to sanctioning, and
whether Mr. Harris should be permanently disbarred from practice for
such a reprehensible offense, or instead suspended for some length of
time. 2 The court chose the lighter sentence of indefinite suspension over
disbarment, in spite of a number of factors leaning heavily towards
disbarment.3 Harris's client was helpless for reasons beyond mere
ignorance of the workings of the legal system; she was mentally unstable
to a degree that required a series of involuntary hospitalizations.4 In
addition, Harris's dishonest conduct had been going on with this client
for a period of nine years. This factual deck was certainly stacked
against Harris in Ohio, where the precedent is to begin with a
presumption of permanent disbarment in cases of intentional
misappropriation.6

1. See Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Ohio 2002) (finding that, in
addition to the misappropriation, the respondent lawyer had also charged his client an excessive fee
and had neglected her interests).
2. See id.
3. See id at 624.
4. See id. at 623.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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How, then, did this court get from a presumption of disbarment to a
conclusion of suspension, in light of the circumstances? It did so through
its application of the amorphous, potentially all-encompassing lawyerfriendly tool of mitigating circumstances.7 In this case, the court felt it
was enough that Harris had a spotless twenty-seven year career (even
though he spent nine of those years stealing from this client), that he was
an honorably discharged veteran, and that he was a regular churchgoer.8
It is difficult to imagine very many smell tests that such a result could
pass, and this particular case is merely one tree in a forest of similar
sanctioning decisions.
A baby must crawl before it can walk, and perhaps that same
progression of movement is appropriate for the sanctioning of unethical
attorneys within a system that has been loudly criticized for its rampant
inconsistency. 9 While those unhappy voices grow in number and
continue to demand a much-needed uniform sanctioning scheme, such a
Herculean task remains unperformed as countless sanctioning injustices
continue to mount. In the meantime, before a set of uniform standards is
constructed that can somehow account for the inordinate number of fact
situations that arise even in the specific area of intentional conversion of
client funds, it might be worthwhile for courts to consider imposing a
bright-line standard for at least the most egregious examples of that
particular violation.
In 1986, the American Bar Association Joint Committee on
Professional Standards developed the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions.10 The main objective of these standards was to assist the
courts in furthering the objectives of lawyer discipline, which include
the goals of maintaining the public's confidence in the legal system and
protecting the public from unethical lawyers by properly deterring
lawyer misconduct, but without making the sanctions so punitive that
they halt lawyers from reporting the ethical violations of other lawyers.11
The ABA Joint Committee intended for these standards to be used as a
non-binding model that would give courts direction while at the same
time leaving room for "flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in
particular cases of lawyer misconduct." 12 As it turns out, creativity is

7.

See id.

8. See id
9. See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the
Standardsfor Imposing Lawyer DisciplineSanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
10. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS (1991) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
11. Seeid. at 1.
12. Id.
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exactly what these standards permitted, to such a great degree that the
Standards have been rendered virtually meaningless.
The interpretation and enforcement of the standards for sanctioning
lawyers guilty of ethical violations remain woefully inconsistent
between jurisdictions and even within individual jurisdictions. 3 The
ABA Standards themselves further such confusion.' 4 With such
inconsistency, the ABA's goals for lawyer discipline remain at least
partly unsatisfied. Moreover, with public confidence in the sanctity of
fiduciary duty related to money handling at such a low in the wake of the
Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco disasters, it is time for jurisdictions to
consider a sanctioning standard for lawyers guilty of conversion from
clients that can be more consistently, and more justly, applied.
Such a standard would serve the courts when faced with the choice
between disbarment and suspension, the only two choices available
when the wrongdoing lawyer has mishandled client property in any
knowing way. 15 Technically and practically, the difference between the
two sanctions is relatively small. Disbarment is permanent in only a
minority of jurisdictions, 16 with generally a five-year minimum before
the lawyer can apply for readmission.' 7 The sanction of suspension
commonly imposes an incapacitation of the lawyer of anywhere from a
few months to three years. 18 Therefore, the actual achievement of such a
bright line standard would be a modest one, especially since disbarred
lawyers are readmitted at a relatively frequent rate. 19 Even though the
difference between disbarment and suspension could be as small as two
years of work for the lawyer, however, the difference becomes
significantly larger when viewed in light of the primary goals of lawyer
sanctioning: the deterrence of lawyer misconduct in order to protect the
public from such harm, and the preservation of public confidence in the
legal system. Disbarment makes it more difficult for the lawyer to get
13. Compare Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2002) with Bar Assoc. of
Greater Cleveland v. McGarry, 398 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio 1979) (similar facts, with suspension applied
in the former case and disbarment in the latter).
14. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 9, at 40 (noting that the commentary to Standard 4.12
confounds analysis by citing to a case contradicting the commentary's previously stated
recommendation regarding the circumstances when suspension is a more appropriate sanction than
disbarment).
15. See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standard 4.1.
16. See id. at Standard 2.2 Commentary.
17. See id.
18. See id. at Standard 2.3.
19. See Ann Davis, The Myth of Disbarment,NAT'L L.J., August 5, 1996, at Al (finding after
a multi-year study that over half of those lawyers applying for readmission after disbarment were
readmitted).
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his or her career back than would a suspension, 20 and there is a stigma
attached to the sanction of disbarment that simply does not exist with a
mere suspension, even an indefinite one. 2 1 For the most egregious
offenses committed by lawyers, the public deserves to see the most
severe sanctions imposed, and nothing short of that will preserve that
public confidence while providing lawyers with the appropriate degree
of deterrence.
There is another component to this difference between disbarment
and suspension that connects to the public's capacity to maintain
confidence in its legal system. While the complex disciplinary
procedural systems that exist in various forms among the states are not
the subject of this Note, there are two wrinkles in such procedures that
put the preservation of that public confidence in particular danger. The
first is that lawyer disciplinary proceedings are often conducted
confidentially before they get to the stage of approval by the courts, with
the purpose of protecting the lawyer's reputation but with the
unfortunate by-product of engendering suspicion of such a secretive
system, an effect to which the ABA was particularly sensitive in its 1992
Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement. 22
The second wrinkle is that such proceedings are conducted almost
primarily by lawyers, where even the inclusion of non-lawyers on the
hearing committees is not enough to overcome the stench of professional
partisanship, not when those lay members fail to ever represent a
majority of the vote, not when they are chosen by members of the legal
profession, and not when they generally refrain from pushing for more
stringent sanctions than the lawyers on the board.2 3 Even by the time
disciplinary proceedings get to a final review by the courts, lawyers are
being judged by judges who were once practicing lawyers, and so there
is a natural tendency to suspect that lenient sanctions might be more the
product of professional solidarity than actual justice.24 Under such a
procedural setting, it becomes even more vitally important that the

20. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, R. 24 and R. 25
Commentary (1996) (noting that there should be a presumption against readmission after
disbarment and that it should not be even considered until at least five years have passed, while for
suspension, if six months or less, reinstatement is automatic if the proper papers are filed).
21.

22.
Hazard,
23.
(1994).
24.

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 2.2 Commentary.
See THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 558-59 (Geoffrey C.

Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1994).
See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 697
See Levin, supra note 9, at 13.
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public feel that the legal system is operating .in an objective, justiceminded fashion.
Part II of this Note will outline the ABA sanctioning standard for
lawyer misappropriation of client funds, and will then examine the basic
jurisdictional approaches to sanctioning guilty lawyers for such an
ethical violation. This part of the Note will look at the two outer
extremes of such enforcement, the case-by-case application favored by
states like Colorado and Ohio, 25 and the bright line standards favored by
New Jersey and the District of Columbia.2 6
Part III will explore the strengths and weaknesses of each approach,
and will argue for a bright line test that gives the courts less opportunity
to allow lawyers guilty of conversion to escape disbarment.
Finally, Part IV will begin to consider what such a bright line test
might be, examining the strengths and weaknesses of the mitigating
factor analysis that the courts use to grant the lighter sentence of
suspension rather than disbarment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Standard 4.1
Most jurisdictions either rely heavily on the ABA Standards, or
have applied their own standards modeled after those proposed by the
ABA.27 For those jurisdictions, conversion of client funds can be found
as the first ethical violation on the list, covered by Standard 4.1. That
standard is broken down into four subsections covering different degrees
of severity. 8 Standard 4.11 speaks to the most severe, recommending
disbarment when the lawyer "knowingly converts client property and
causes injury or potential injury to a client., 29 Moving one step down in
severity, Standard 4.12 recommends suspension when the lawyer
"knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client
30
property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.,
It is between these two sanctioning standards that the courts face
confusion. Before the courts get to that point, Standard 3.0 lays some
25. See generally People v. Tidwell, 35 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2001); Cleveland Bar Assoc. v.
Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 2002).
26. See generally In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979); In re Addams,. 579 A.2d 190
(D.C. 1990).
27. See Levin, supranote 9, at 33-35.
28. See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standard 4.1.
29. Id. at Standard 4.11.
30. Id. at Standard 4.12.
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groundwork to help clarify the decision. This Standard gives the court
four factors to consider before imposing a sanction: "(a) the duty
violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; and (c) the actual or potential
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors.",3' This Note will be concerned with
the intentional conversion of client funds. Therefore, for the purpose of
this Note, assume that the duty violated, conversion, has already been
proven. Also, assume that the lawyers' mental state, which the ABA
Standards classify as either intent, knowledge, or negligence,32 is intent,
and the injury is significant.
The only variable existing in the cases that will be covered within is
factor (d), the consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Standards 9.2 and 9.3 provide a list of such possible
factors.33 Standard 9.21 defines aggravation as those circumstances or
factors "that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. 3 4 9.22 lists nine factors that may be considered in such a way:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a
pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction
of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with
rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false
evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the
disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of
conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience
in the
35
practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution.

As this Note will examine and as the Harris case has already
exhibited,36 such factors fail to get nearly the amount of court time that
the mitigating factors do.
Mitigating factors are the opposite of aggravating factors. They are
those considerations that give the court justification for reducing the
degree of the sanction imposed upon the guilty lawyer. 37 There are
thirteen factors listed:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good
31. Id. at Standard 3.0.
32. See id. at Standard 3.0 Commentary.
33. See id. at Standards 9.2 and 9.3
34. Id. at Standard 9.21
35. Id. at Standard 9.22
36. See Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio 2002) (dismissing
summarily the vulnerability of the wronged client after paying it lip service).
37. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.31.
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faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or
cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the
practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical or mental
disability or impairment; (i)delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation; (k) imposition of other
38 penalties or sanctions;
offenses.
prior
of
remoteness
(m)
remorse;
(1)
Although the commentary to the mitigating factors list does some
work to clarify the application of mitigating factor (d), restitution, the
commentaries to these lists provide very little guidance into how they
should be weighed, except to note that cases concerning physical and
mental impairment of the lawyer are particularly difficult to treat.39 The
commentaries also list one illustrating case for each aggravating or
mitigating circumstance.4 ° Such a means of clarification is not all that
helpful when a single case cannot possibly provide much insight into
how such factors should be applied in a variety of factual situations.
Because room for manipulation exists, a handful of jurisdictions have all
but discarded the usage of aggravating and mitigating factors in their
decisions on how to sanction lawyers guilty of intentionally converting
client funds, preferring to approach such decisions with a presumption
towards disbarment while not quite adopting a per se rule of
disbarment.41

B.

The (Almost) Bright Line Tests

Two jurisdictions in particular, New Jersey and the District of
Columbia, have taken a good deal of heat for adopting a notably
draconian stance on lawyers guilty of intentional misappropriation.42
However, these jurisdictions have kept an intensely focused eye on the
policy goals underlying lawyer discipline, and have refused to provide
the wiggle room for courts to use mitigating factor considerations as a
rationale for more lenient sanctioning.

38. Id., at Standard 9.32.
39. See id. at Commentary.
40. See id, at Standard 9.22 Commentary; Standard 9.32 Commentary.
41. See generally In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979); In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190
(D.C. 1990).
42. See generally Melissa E. Nirenberg, Note, Reconsidering the Wilson Doctrine: Should
New Jersey Continue to Automatically and Permanently Disbar Attorneys Who Have
MisappropriatedFunds?, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 713 (1999).
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1. In re Wilson

In 1978, the Supreme Court of New Jersey delivered a short five
page decision that had the landmark effect of implementing great change
in sanctioning standards in New Jersey, to a degree that no other state
had then seen.43
Attorney Wendell Wilson was caught intentionally and wrongfully
possessing over $27,000 of his clients' money.4 Wilson was also found
guilty of lying to clients, wantonly disregarding their interests, and
advising them to commit fraud. 45 None of those additional violations
mattered to the court; it was working on the belief that intentional
misappropriation alone was sufficient to warrant disbarment.46 Chief
Justice Wilentz, the author of the opinion, minced no words regarding
the seriousness of such an action, proclaiming that "[n]o clearer wrong
suffered by a client at the hands of one he had every reason to trust can
be imagined. 'A 7 The preservation of the public's confidence in the bar
and the legal system was first and foremost on this court's mind, and
such was its moral foundation for determining that mitigating factors
will rarely provide a lawyer an escape from disbarment.48
The Wilson court condemned three of the mitigating factors other
courts in New Jersey had previously utilized in their sanctioning
determinations for intentional conversion, all three of which eventually
appeared in the ABA Standards' list of mitigating factors. 49 Restitution
was the factor most often relied upon by the courts up until that point,
and so the court directed most of its attention towards restitution as a
mitigating factor. 50 Relying on the reasoning of a very old case, the court
forcefully dismissed such a factor as having no relevance to a lawyer's
intentional conversion:
"We do not attach very much importance, as a rule, to the matter of
restitution, because that may depend more upon financial ability or
other favoring circumstances than repentance or reformation. A
43.
44.

See generally In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979).
See id. at 1154.

45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 1155.
48. See id. at 1157-58.
49. See id. at 1156-57. Even though this opinion was delivered eight years before the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions was devised, the New Jersey courts, like most courts in
other states, did consider particular factors as mitigation, such as "the economic and emotional
pressures on the attorney which caused and explained his misdeed; his subsequent compliance with
client trust account requirements; his candor and cooperation with the ethics committee; his
contrition; and, most of all, restitution." Id. at 1155.
50. Seeid. at 1156.
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1007

thoroughly bad man may make restitution, if he is able, in order to
rehabilitate himself and regain his position in the community; and
51 a
thoroughly good man may be unable to make any restitution at all."
The court went on to attack the usefulness of a prior outstanding
career and the inexperience of the wrongdoing lawyer as mitigating
factorsf 2 Chief Justice Wilentz proclaimed that "[t]his offense against
common honesty should be clear even to the youngest; and53 to
distinguished practitioners, its grievousness should be even clearer."
The Wilson court was not entirely unsympathetic to the risk of
injustice inherent in the creation of such a strict, bright-line standard,
noting that stress and financial pressures could, for instance, force a
perfectly moral lawyer, capable of reformation, into feeling the necessity
to steal for the benefit of his family.5 4 The continued confidence of the
public in the legal system trumped even that tragic a possibility,
according to the court. 55
Critics of the Wilson rule find such reasoning too harsh, especially
since New Jersey is one of the few jurisdictions where disbarment is
almost exclusively permanent. 6 Of particular concern is the shifting of
that reasoning by New Jersey courts in the wake of Wilson to cases
where the lawyer guilty of intentional conversion did so while afflicted
with some form of physical or mental conditions or addictions, such as
alcoholism, drug addictions, or compulsive gambling. 57 Where such
lawyers committed their violations when going through such an illness,
and later rehabilitated themselves, the push for allowing such a factor to
be considered as mitigation is based on the fact that such a lawyer is no
longer the same person he or she was when committing the offense,
therefore eroding the deterrent effect of disbarment in such cases while
providing the public with enough reasoned information that this lawyer
is no longer a threat, thus preserving the public's confidence in the
system.
In any event, the Wilson court did not create a per se rule for
disbarment, only a rule for a strong presumption of disbarment in
intentional conversion cases. In the conclusion of his opinion, Chief

51. See id.(quoting In re Hawkins, 87 A. 243, 247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1913)) (quotations in
original).
52. Seeid. atll57.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See Nirenberg, supra note 42, at 715.
Seeid at 719-20.
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Justice Wilentz declared that "mitigating factors will rarely override the
requirement of disbarment." 58 The word "rarely" left the door slightly
ajar, but the court was relatively silent as to when that opening could be
exploited. The District of Columbia was not as tight-lipped about its
presumption towards disbarment rule.
2. In re Addams
In 1990, after a series of cases leading to the development of this
result, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals created its own
presumption of disbarment in In re Addams.5 9 The Addams decision
created a standard that was both more lenient than Wilson and, on its
face, more strict. While Wilson all but eradicated the usage of any
mitigating factors as a means of avoiding disbarment, the Addams court
advocated the consideration of such factors, but only when they
persuasively outweighed the existence of any aggravating factors.6 °
Where the Addams decision appeared to endorse a result even
stricter than Wilson was in the application of the facts of the case. 6' In
Addams, the wrongdoing lawyer returned money he had improperly
taken out of his client's escrow account, and his client, who was
perfectly content with her lawyer's performance, never complained
about such action.62 In actuality, Addams had been doing this client the
favor of working for her despite the fact that she was continually tardy in
paying for his services, and he had taken the money out of the escrow
account as a means of paying for services the client had not yet paid for
directly.63 The lawyer contributed somewhat towards his own
disbarment, however, by adding an aggravating factor to the mix: he
presented dishonest and conflicting explanations for his misconduct to
the disciplinary board. 64
The extraordinary nature of the facts of the case is represented by
the disciplinary board's original recommendation: four votes for
disbarment, and four votes for suspension for a year and one day.65
Faced with such a split, the DC Court of Appeals tackled the facts head
on, and determined that corrupt intent was irrelevant; as long as the
lawyer intentionally, knowingly misappropriated funds, even if not
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Wilson, 409 A.2d at 1158.
579 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1990).
See id.
at 191.
See id.
at 199.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
at 191.
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specifically for his own benefit or for the purpose of injuring the client,
disbarment would be presumed.66 Thus, in effect, this court eliminated
from consideration entirely mitigating factor (b), the "absence of a
dishonest or selfish motive." 67 Boiled down to its essence, this resulted
in the court's adoption of the rule that disbarment was always presumed
in all misappropriation cases except those resulting from the presence of
simple negligence.6 8
As in Wilson, the Addams court was most concerned
about the
protection of the public and the preservation of the public's confidence
in the integrity of the bar and the legal system, but was not without
69
reservations regarding the potential harshness of its presumptive rule.
The majority opinion did concede that unfair results were possible and
should be avoided, noting specifically the circumstance of a violating
70
lawyer's rehabilitation from a physical impairment such as alcoholism.
This reasoning led the court to adopt a test approaching the balancing
test between aggravating factors and mitigating factors envisioned by the
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, except that this court
required that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors to a
substantial degree. 7'
According to the concurrence by Associate Judge Ferren, this
espoused balancing test was so stringent that it barely existed as a
balancing test at all, that for all of the majority's insistence that it was
avoiding a per se rule of disbarment, that is precisely what it adopted
when it made the presumption of disbarment so unusually difficult to
rebut.72 Judge Ferren noted the danger of completely eliminating the lack
of venal intent as a mitigating factor when he brought up the
hypothetical case of a lawyer who, with no intent to harm the client,
replaces misappropriated funds after a negligibly short period of time.73
Judge Ferren went on to note that, "[a]lthough predictability may be
fostered by per se rules, this benefit is offset by a real risk of injustice
when the individual circumstances of a case cannot -be taken into
account in imposing sanctions. 7 4

66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.at 199.
ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standard 9.32.

See Addams, 579 A.2d at 191.
See id.
at 194.
Seeid.at 194-95.
See id.
at 191.
Seeid at201.
See id.
Id. at 202 (emphasis in original).
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On the other hand, Judge Ferren did agree with the majority that the
offense of intentional conversion does warrant a more stringent standard
than other ethical offenses, and that opinion is supported by his
75
agreement with the result of the balancing test in this particular case.
Even though the wrongdoing lawyer had on his side a previously
spotless twenty-two year record, full satisfaction from his client even
considering the violation, and the client's owing of fees substantially in
excess of the funds the lawyer misappropriated, Judge Ferren held that
the lawyer's false accountings to the client and to the disciplinary board
were enough to overwhelm such mitigating factors. 76 Judge Ferren
reminded the court of the possible injustices that can come from too
heavy a lean towards disbarment, but by the same token he seemed to
endorse a significantly more weighted balancing test than the evenhanded balancing suggested by the ABA Standards.7 7
Both the Wilson and Addams courts struggled with the question of
how to handle the balance between a potentially meaningless
sanctioning standard that could result from a too ill-defined system of
mitigation and aggravation and a standard that was too suffocating to
allow for unusual fact patterns. They tried to achieve this by examining
the legitimacy of individual mitigating circumstances, and poking
enough holes in them to justify their exclusion from consideration.
Wilson ruled for the practical abandonment of such factors, while
Addams ruled only that such factors be given significantly less weight
than they had been given previously. Addams does the better job of
addressing the possibility of inequitable results, but even that decision,
without giving much guidance for future courts to handle such thorny
issues as lawyer alcoholism, opens the door to unjust outcomes. Do the
jurisdictions that give their courts free reign to decide between
disbarment and suspension in cases of intentional conversion of client
funds achieve more fully the balance between the public-minded policy
goals underlying the standards of lawyer discipline and protection of
lawyers from draconian sanctions?
C. The Case by Case Jurisdictions
Some states employ presumptions of disbarment similar to those
used by New Jersey and the District of Columbia, although with some

75. See id at 203.
76. See id.
77.

See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss3/5

12

Luty: In the Matter of Mitigation: The Necessity of a Less Discretionar

IN THE M TTER OF MITIGATION

added room for consideration of mitigation. 78 Other states employ no
bright lines of any kind in their lawyer sanctioning, even for intentional
conversion of client funds, either following the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions directly as a non-binding guide,79 or
developing their own disciplinary standards modeled after the ABA
Standards.8 ° Under either system, the process for the determination of
disciplinary sanctions consists of multiple steps. 81 A court will first use
as a guideline the recommendation of that particular jurisdiction's
disciplinary review department, as well as its own precedents applied in
cases with similar fact patterns, in addition to conducting its own
application of the jurisdiction's disciplinary standards.82 In applying
those standards, the courts generally conduct a two-step process:
determining the presumptive sanction based on the ethical duty violated,
the lawyer's mental state, and the extent of the actual or potential harm
caused by the violation, and then balancing out the relevant aggravating
and mitigating factors to determine whether that presumptive sanction
should be reduced.83
Such consideration of what mitigates is not an exact science, as
noted in In re Buckalew, one of the first cases to utilize the ABA
Standards: "There is no 'magic formula' to determine which or how
many mitigating circumstances justify the reduction of an otherwise
appropriate sanction. Each case presents different circumstances which
must be weighed
against the nature and gravity of the lawyer's
84
misconduct.,
As noted earlier, there are ten aggravating factors and thirteen
mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards.8 5 However, many of
these factors are simply mirror opposites of factors on the other side,
78. See, e.g., In re Carey, 809 A.2d 563, 564 (Del. 2002) ("In every prior Delaware
disciplinary matter in which an attorney has intentionally misappropriated client funds, the attorney
has been disbarred."); Fla. Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2000) ("This Court has also
held that disbarment is presumed to be the appropriate discipline for misuse of client funds;
however, this presumption can be rebutted by mitigating circumstances.").
79. See generally In re Phillips, No. SB-02-0060-D, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 87 (Ariz. May 24,
2002); People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1997); In re Triem, 929 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1996);
Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582 (Miss. 2000); Hartford/New Britain Judicial Dist. v. Millstein,
CV 940538618S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1618 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10,1997).
80. See generally Fla. Bar v. Vining, 707 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1998); In re Dawkins, 587 N.E.2d
761 (Mass. 1992); Disciplinary Bd. v. Keller, 652 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 2002).
81. See, e.g., In re Huddleston, 974 P.2d 325, 332 (Wash. 1999); In re Brown, 906 P.2d 1184,
1191 (Cal. 1995).
82. See, e.g., Brown, 906 P.2d at 1191.
83. See In re Huddleston, 974 P.2d at 331-32.
84. In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 54 (Alaska 1986).
85. See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standards 9.2-9.3.
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concerning either the presence or the absence of that particular factor,
making the total number of factors closer to eleven or twelve rather than
twenty-three. 86 The remainder of the background section to this Note
will examine the ways in which these case-by-case jurisdictions evaluate
each of these factors.
1. Prior Offenses, or Lack Thereof
There is one ABA aggravating factor and two mitigating factors
that concern those offenses of the lawyer which took place prior to the
current disciplinary proceeding, and they are often considered together
in the same case. 87 On the side of aggravation, there is Standard 9.22(a)
(the presence of prior offenses).8 8 Alternative mitigating factors are
Standards 9.32(a) (the absence of prior offenses), and 9.32(m) (the
remoteness of prior offenses). With deterrence of the offender as one of
the main goals of lawyer discipline,89 the presence of a past record, in
the light of the lawyer's current wrongdoing, will naturally lead courts to
assume that the lawyer requires a more severe sanction in order to be
properly deterred from acting out yet again.
Courts will take into consideration the nature and severity of the
prior offenses, however. 90 Oregon, in particular, has laid out an explicit,
multi-prong balancing test for the consideration of prior offenses as
aggravation:
(1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting sanction;
(2) the similarity of the prior offense to the offense in the case at bar;
(3) the number of prior offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior
offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in relation to the prior
offense and resulting sanction, specifically, whether the accused
for the prior offense before engaging in the
lawyer had been sanctioned
91
offense in the case at bar.
This test is used to determine how much weight to give such
offenses in the sanctioning determination.9 2 Offenses that get further
away in time and similarity begin to drift away from aggravation and

86. For example, ABA Standard 9.22(a) concerns the presence of prior disciplinary offenses,
while Standard 9.32(a) concerns the absence of prior discipline.
87. See, e.g., In re Triem, 929 P.2d 634, 644-45 (Alaska 1996).
88. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.22.
89. See Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582, 585 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Pitts v. Miss. State
Bar Ass'n, 462 So. 2d 340, 343 (Miss. 1985)).
90. See, e.g., In re Jones, 951 P.2d 149, 152 (Or. 1997).
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., id.
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move closer to the mitigation of remoteness.9 3 The timing of the prior
offense is also taken. into account by this test, in that the court will
determine if such timing permitted the wrongdoing lawyer to ignore the
deterring effect of a previous sanction.94
When it comes to the intentional conversion of client funds,
however, such a balancing test does not often enter into the picture. For
instance, in the Colorado case People v. Lavenhar, there was no
indication by the court that two prior offenses resulting only in letters of
admonition were given any less weight as aggravation because of their
small severity or dissimilarity to conversion.9 5 Particular aggravation
weight is given to
prior offenses when they combine to form a
96
discernible pattern.
While the absence of prior offenses will sometimes be taken as
meaningful mitigation, especially since it is often entwined with
determinations of character, 97 this is not always the case. Some courts
fail to consider the absence of prior offenses as any mitigation, finding
that because there are directly alternating factors under the mitigation
and aggravation ABA Standards, that the absence of prior offenses "is
not particularly strong
since it consists in the mere absence of a certain
' 98
aggravating factor.

2. Dishonest of Selfish Motive, or Lack Thereof
While the Wilson and Addams courts rejected any need to show that
an attorney guilty of intentionally converting client funds acted with a
dishonest or selfish motive, 99 other jurisdictions following the ABA
standards have been more willing to consider the lack of such motivation
as mitigation. 00 In the alternative, those courts following the ABA do
93. See, e.g., In re Kimmell, 31 P.3d 414, 419 (Or. 2001) (holding that the prior offenses,
which resulted only in public reprimand, were sufficiently different than the misconduct at issue so
as to lessen their significance).
94. See, e.g., In re Starr, 952 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Or. 1998) (holding that only a moderate
amount of weight should be given to particular prior offense, because it "occurred at roughly the
same time as the events giving rise to the present proceeding, so the accused's acts herein do not
reflect a disregard of an earlier adverse ethical determination").
95. See People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Colo. 1997).
96. See, e.g.,.In re Nassif, 547 N.W.2d 541, 544 (N.D. 1996).
97. See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Ohio 2002).
98. Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582, 587 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Foote v. Miss. State Bar
Ass'n, 517 So. 2d 561, 565 (Miss. 1987)).
99. See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 194 n.9 (D.C. 1990) (defining misappropriation as "any
unauthorized use of client's funds entrusted to him [or her], including not only stealing but also
unauthorized temporary use for the lawyer's own purpose, whether or not he [or she] derives any
personal gain or benefit therefrom," quoting In re Wilson 409 A.2d 1153, 1155 n. I (1979)).
100. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.32(b).
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consider the presence of such a motive as aggravation. 10 The ABA
Standards do not support disbarment or suspension for a technical
conversion resulting from negligence, 10 2 but when it comes to the
intentional taking of client funds, the wrongdoing lawyer will have a
difficult time getting the benefit of Standard 9.22(b). 10 3 Jurisdictions
have disagreed over whether an attorney who practices self-help has
taken client funds with a dishonest or selfish motive. 104 For the purposes
of this Note, which will concern itself with lawyers who have clearly
converted client money with the knowledge that they had no right to do
so, such disputes will remain irrelevant. Dishonest intent is established
by the very act of intentional conversion itself.'0 5
3. Cooperation with the Disciplinary Proceedings, or Lack
Thereof
ABA Standards 9.22(e) and 9.22(f) present as aggravating factors
the bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding and the practice
of deception during such proceedings, respectively.10 6 An attitude of full
cooperation in the disciplinary proceedings, however, will count towards
the mitigation of sanctioning pursuant to Standard 9.32(e). 10 7 The courts
have been quite clear as to when these issues apply. If a lawyer fails to
comply with a hearing panel's discovery order, he has fallen under
Standard 9.22(e). 10 8 If a lawyer submits false statements during the
disciplinary process, he has fallen under Standard 9.32(f). 10 9 In contrast
to prior offenses, it is possible for a lawyer to gain neither the benefit of
the mitigating factor nor the drawback of the aggravating factor. In
Cotton v. The Mississippi Bar, the court held that "the mere absence of
an attempt by the attorney to mislead the Bar or the Court as to what was
done, particularly where there is a default judgment, is a neutral

101. See id at Standard 9.22(b).
102. See id. at 4.13.
103. See, e.g., People v. Tidwell, 35 P.3d 624, 628 (Colo. 2001) (holding that once it is
determined that the misappropriation was knowing, there can be no mitigation for motive, citing
People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 11 (Colo. 1996)).
104. Compare Att'y Grievance Comm'n Of Md. v. Sheridan, 741 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md. 1999)
with In re Young, 488 N.E.2d 1014 (Ill. 1986) (concerning similar situations of lawyers having
valid beliefs that the property was rightfully theirs and not the clients, with two different results
concerning whether this had an affect on the determination of the lawyer's motive.)
105. See, e.g., In re Rivera, 654 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
106. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standards 9.22(e), 9.22().
107. See id. at Standard 9.32(e).
108. See, e.g., Disciplinary Bd. v. Keller, 652 N.W.2d 308, 312 (N.D. 2002).
109. See, e.g., People v. Post, GC98B102, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80 (Colo. May 15,
2000).
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factor,"1 0 and that even candid admissions of guilt do not equate to full
and free cooperation in the absence of other participation in the
process.'' Finally, even if a lawyer fully and freely cooperates with the
disciplinary proceedings, courts will not give such cooperation the credit
of mitigation if it deems that 12such cooperation was coerced by the
authorities involved in the case."
4.

Personal/Emotional Problems, Physical/Mental Impairments,
and Interim Rehabilitation
These are the first standards on either list (mitigating in this case)
that do not have a corresponding standard on the other side. 13 There is
no aggravating black mark given to an attorney who intentionally
converts client funds while entirely within his or her right mind. While
each of these mitigating factors deals with influences affecting the
clarity of the wrongdoer's judgment, they are not treated equally by the
courts. Personal or emotional problems are not given much weight, since
such problems are generally more
commonplace and manageable than
14
impairments."
mental
or
physical
Physical and mental impairments are not so commonplace and
manageable. They are treated more seriously and are more likely to be
considered as strong mitigating factors at times. 1 5 However, the 1992
version of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions proposed
a multi-prong test for the determination of whether a particular example
of physical or mental impairment sufficed as mitigation. 16 As
articulated by the courts, this test allowed for such an impairment to be
considered as mitigation only when:
(1) there is medical evidence that the Respondent is affected by a
chemical dependency or mental disability; (2) the chemical
dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the
Respondent's recovery from the chemical dependency or mental
110. Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582 ,587 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Foote v. Miss. State Bar
Ass'n, 517 So.2d 561, 565 (Miss. 1987)).
111. See id. at 589.
112. See, e.g., Post, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80 (2000).
113. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standards 9.32(c), 9.32(h), 9.320).
114. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Korones, 752 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. 2000) (holding that such personal
problems as marital and economic issues "are visited upon a great number of lawyers. Clearly, we
cannot excuse an attorney for dipping into his trust funds as a means of solving personal problems,"
quoting Fla. Bar v. Shanzer, 572 So. 2d 1382, 1384 (Fla. 1991)).
115. See, e.g., Miami County Bar Assoc. v. Hallows, 676 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio 1997) (handing
down suspension rather than disbarment for a lawyer who intentionally converted over fifty
thousand dollars, due to the lawyer's alcoholism and no other mitigating factor.)
116. See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.32(i) (Supp. 1992).
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disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of
the misconduct
successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested
7
and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely.1
Proof of all four factors, medical evidence that the impairment
exists, causation, rehabilitation, and the rehabilitation's probable halting
of any future misconduct, must be present under this test in order to
qualify as mitigation.' 18 Courts have discarded the entire issue as
mitigation due to the failure of a single element.' Even before the
creation of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, courts
were approaching such impairments in this way. In Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Silva, a Hawaii case, the lawyer's alcoholism
was thrown out as a mitigating factor because he had displayed no
progress in controlling his drinking, despite going through some
rehab. 19 In the Colorado case, People v. Post, the court explicitly
referred to this test and rejected the lawyer's medical depression and
post-concussive syndrome because no evidence was submitted to show
that such conditions caused the misconduct, nor had the lawyer
submitted to any meaningful period of rehabilitation. 120 In People v.
Lavenhar, another Colorado case, the court discounted even the
possibility of adequate recovery and the halting of the misconduct as a
result of recovery, due to persuasive evidence that the impairment, a
personality disorder with anti-social aspects, was generally not subject to
effective treatment.121 Finally, there are some courts that, while willing
to consider impairments such as alcoholism as some measure of
mitigation, will not allow it alone to constitute full mitigation from
disbarment down to suspension, 122 noting that "[t]he attorney's impaired
judgment diminishes the responsibility he must bear, but does not
eliminate it. Not all alcoholics appropriate the money of their clients; the
may be smooth, but it is neither automatic
slide from drink to 'dishonor
23
nor uncontrollable."'
Some courts have paid particularly close attention to the character
of the interim rehabilitation, and have discounted it when it fails to meet

117. In re Benton, No. SB-01-0156-D, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 180 at *13 (Ariz. Nov. 7,2001).
118.

See, e.g., id.

119. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Silva, 633 P.2d 538, 545 (Haw. 1981).
120. See People v. Post, GC98B 102, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80 (Colo. May 15, 2000).
121. See People v. Lavenhar, 934 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Colo. 1997).
122. See Hartford/New Britain Judicial Dist. v. Millstein, CV 940538618S, 1997 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1618 at *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 1997).
123. See id. at *16 (quoting In re Driscoll, 423 N.E.2d 873 (Ill., 1981)).
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certain standards of thoroughness. 24 These courts require a sufficiently
lengthy period of attendance in rehabilitation
programs, holding that
25
enrollment alone is never enough.1
5. Restitution, or Lack Thereof
The Commentary to the ABA Standards isolates restitution, along
with personal problems and physical impairments, as a mitigating factor
that receives particularly diverse treatment by the courts. 26 The
Commentary endorses a good faith effort by the wrongdoing lawyer to
make restitution as a mitigating factor, while discarding as mitigation
those instances where the lawyer is coerced into paying back the
misappropriated money.127 The ABA Standards propose the timeliness
of the restitution as a measuring stick for the sincerity behind it: the
longer into the proceedings that restitution is made, the less weight given
to it as a mitigating factor. 128 Courts have followed this guidance,
negating as a 9.32(d) mitigating factor any restitution paid after the start
of the disciplinary proceedings, but not necessarily turning such late
payment into a 9.220) aggravating factor. 129 Some courts will refuse to
give any mitigating credit for restitution to lawyers guilty of
intentionally misappropriating client
funds, especially when such
30
restitution was made under pressure.'
6. Vulnerability
ABA Standard 9.22(h) recognizes the helplessness of certain clients
to wrongdoing attorneys as an aggravating factor.' 3' There is no
corresponding mitigating credit for a lawyer who steals from a generally
capable client. There are various forms of vulnerability that different
jurisdictions recognize, while sometimes a court will basically ignore the
concept altogether. 32 Those courts that do recognize it as a factor in

124.
690, 696
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
2000).
130.
131.
132.

See, e.g., In re McGough, 793 P.2d 430, 437 (Wash.1990); In re Ewaniszyk, 788 P.2d
(Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., McGough, 793 P.2d at 437.
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.32 Commentary.
See id.
See id.
See, e.g., People v. Post, GC98B102, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80 (Colo. May 15,
See, e.g., Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582, 587 (Miss. 2000).
See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standard 9.22(h).
See, e.g., Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ohio 2002).
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aggravation consider 3 both
medical/physical limitations, 133 as well as
4
emotional incapacity.'
One local court in Connecticut took a particularly novel approach to
the consideration of vulnerability.' 35 In a case where the wrongdoing
lawyer had instituted a federal lawsuit against the judge as an apparent
stall tactic in her own disciplinary proceedings, the court found the
aggravating factor of vulnerability not because any of the lawyer's
clients were especially vulnerable, but because the lawyer had made the
public at large vulnerable by attacking the civil justice system, using the
vulnerability of judges who have 36
limited means to protect themselves
from such unsubstantiated attacks. 1

7. Remorse, or Lack Thereof
ABA Standard 9.32(1) gives credit to the lawyer who shows
remorse, while 9.22(g) penalizes the lawyer who exhibits none. 137 As
with restitution, when there is a gesture of remorse, the sincerity of such
a gesture is measured by its timeliness, by the nature of its expression,
and in light of the surrounding circumstances. 38 In one case, the court
refused to consider as remorse, for purposes of mitigation, the
wrongdoing lawyer's submitting to a stipulation whereby he implicitly
acknowledged his misconduct, especially since there was no concurrent
explicit acknowledgement of the misconduct. 139 Another court entirely
disregarded the lawyer's expression of remorse, because this particular
lawyer had made similar expressions during the many prior disciplinary
actions in which he was involved, thus140 giving the court much reason to
doubt the sincerity of such expression.
8. A Pattern of Misconduct and Multiple Offenses
These two ABA-devised aggravating factors, 9.22(c) (pattern of
misconduct) and 9.22(d) (multiple offenses), 14 1 relate to the nature and
133. See, e.g., In re Rotman, 556 N.E.2d 243, 253 (Ill. 1990) (including the mental
incompetence of the client as aggravation).
134. See, e.g., In re Starr, 952 P.2d 1017, 1028 (Or. 1998) (including the fact that the client
was vulnerable, due to the threat of losing her child, as aggravation).
135. See Sullivan v. Town of Monroe, CV000370545, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3141 at *15
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2001).
136. See id.
137. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standards 9.22(g), 9.32(l).
138. See, e.g., People v. Post, GC98B102, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80 (Colo. May 15,
2000); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lau, 941 P.2d 295, 300 (Haw. 1997).
139. See Post, 2000 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 80.
140. See Lau, 941 P.2d at 300.
141. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standards 9.22(c), 9.22(d).
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extent of the wrongdoing, and are generally used interchangeably by the
courts. 142 There is no corresponding ABA mitigating factor that gives
credit to the lawyer whose violation consists of a single act, although
the
43
lack of multiple offenses will sometimes be treated as mitigation.1
Courts generally interpret these two aggravating factors in a
straightforward fashion, treating more harshly those wrongdoing lawyers
whose misconduct consisted of a number of bad acts, rather than just
one.144 On the other hand, what appears on its face to be a solitary act
will sometimes be broken down into a multiplicity of misconduct.14 5 In
one case, the court noted that "although (the lawyer's wrongdoing) may
be viewed as a single, isolated incident, it involved intentionally lying to
both respondent's clients and to the court, in order to carry out the
conversion of funds which should have been turned over to the
clients."' 146 One court found no47meaningful distinction between multiple
offenses and isolated offenses. 1
9. Character or Reputation
Except for the presence of prior offenses, there is no ABA
aggravating factor for bad character outside of the misconduct at issue,
and it is difficult to find cases that deliver more severe sanctioning for
wrongdoing lawyers who are shown to be less than high-quality human
beings outside of the misconduct for which they are currently being
punished. When there is the presence of prior offenses committed by the
lawyer, any additional proof of good character is generally considered to
be irrelevant. 148 Proof of good character for the purposes of mitigation
comes in two forms: testimony from witnesses that the wrongdoing
lawyer is a good person, and evidence that the lawyer has served the
community well49over a significant period of time or through numerous
honorable acts. 1

142. Compare Fla. Bar v. Mavrides, 442 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1983) with State ex. rel. Okla. Bar
Assoc. v. Warzyn, 624 P.2d 1068 (Okla. 1981) (these two cases, listed in the ABA commentary as
illustrative examples of ABA Standard 9.22(c) and 9.22(d), respectively, create no distinction
between a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses).
143. See, e.g., In re Albanese, 710 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (N.Y. App. Div.. 2000).
144.
145.

See, e.g., In re Cohen, 456 N.E.2d 105, 110 (Ill. 1983).
See, e.g., In re Harley, 744 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (N.Y. App. Div.. 2002).

146. Id.
147. See People v. Torpy, 966 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Colo. 1998) (holding that it did not matter for
disciplinary purposes whether the wrongdoing lawyer withdrew nine thousand dollars of his clients
funds all at once or if he, as had a disbarred lawyer in a prior case, withdrew the money over a
longer time frame using a number of checks).
148.

See, e.g., In re Hunter, 769 A.2d 1286, 1290 (Vt. 2000).

149.

See, e.g., In re Young, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ill. 1986).
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These types of character evidence are not necessarily given the
same weight. For good acts within the community, such evidence is
sometimes discarded even when the lawyer
spent a significant amount of
150
time performing such civic-minded acts.
When it comes to letters or testimony from individuals vouching for
the character of the wrongdoing lawyer, such testimony is given weight
only if it is clear that the testimonials have come from people who are
fully aware of the lawyer's misconduct, and still consider him or her to
be trustworthy despite such misconduct.15 1 The status of the witnesses
vouching for the wrongdoing lawyer matters as well; members of the
legal community are held in particularly high esteem in these
proceedings, and when the lawyer cannot get a member of the legal
community to vouch for his or her integrity, such an absence is
sometimes considered to partially deflate whatever character evidence
does exist. 152 However, some jurisdictions, such as California, do not
want judges to voluntarily testify on the behalf of a lawyer in a
disciplinary proceeding, fearing that introducing the prestige of their
position into such a proceeding would give their testimony an undue
amount of weight.'53
The amount of weight given to character evidence; in general,
varies greatly among courts. When it comes to intentional conversion,15a4
court will occasionally find no place for character-based mitigation.
Other courts, such as the one that ruled in the aforementioned Cleveland
Bar Association v. Harris,have allowed character evidence alone, absent
any other mitigating factors, to mitigate a sanction from disbarment
down to suspension for intentional conversion.'5 5 A jurisdiction like
California has been more careful than the ABA Standards to ensure that
if such evidence is going to be used as mitigation, it had better be
powerful, requiring "[a]n extraordinary demonstration of good character
attested to by a wide range of references in the general and legal

150.

See, e.g., In re Rotman, 556 N.E.2d 243, 249-50 (Ill. 1990) (ordering disbarment despite

the fact that at varying points in his career, the lawyer worked at a homeless person emergency
hotline four hours a week, helped at a local soup kitchen, spent ten to fifteen hours per month as a
board member for a New York theater company, two or three hours a month as a board member for
a not-for-profit dance company, and held membership in a lawyers' group that raised money for
Meals on Wheels).
151. See, e.g., In re Parks, 396 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Minn. 1986).
152.

See, e.g., Blair v. State Bar, 781 P.2d 933, 942-43 (Cal. 1989).

153. See Aronin v. State Bar, 801 P.2d 403, 410 n.4 (Cal. 1990) (referring to a California
judicial conduct rule and commentary).
154.

See, e.g., In re Cohn, 503 N.Y.S.2d 759, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).

155.

See Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Ohio 2002).
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who are aware of the full extent of the member's
communities 56
misconduct."1
Delay in Disciplinary Proceedings, and the Imposition of
Other Penalties or Sanctions.
These two mitigating factors, ABA Standards 9.32(i) (delay in
disciplinary proceedings) and 9.32(k) (imposition of other penalties or
sanctions) serve to take into account the amount 157of hardship already
inflicted upon the lawyer for his or her misconduct.
Standard 9.32(k) has been occasionally interpreted in a manner
different from that intended by the ABA Standards. The ABA
Commentary to Standard 9.32(k) lists a number of cases meant to
illustrate the purpose of the standard, all of which consist of wrongdoing
lawyers given a break in their sanctioning due to having already received
some measure of sanctioning for the same misconduct. 158 By contrast,
some courts will occasionally give a lawyer a similar kind of break due
to sanctioning they received from wholly unrelated misconduct.' 59 More
often, courts will apply this standard in accordance with the ABA's
intent, such as the holding in Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Chatelain,
that "[w]hen a second disciplinary proceeding against an attorney
involves misconduct which occurred during the same time period as the
first proceeding, the overall discipline to be imposed should be
determined as 60if both proceedings were before the court
simultaneously." 1
When it comes to a delay between the time of the misconduct and
the time of the disciplinary proceedings, the concern of the courts is
whether the lawyer was prejudiced by such a delay.' 61 Such prejudice
must come in the form of a diminished ability to collect evidence, much
like the type of prejudice intended to be avoided by statutes of
limitation.162 A diminished capacity to practice law due to the imposition
10.

156. Blair v. State Bar, 781 P.2d at 942-43 (holding that reliance of testimony from one client,
a former law clerk, and a minister failed to qualify either as an "extraordinary demonstration" or a
"wide range of references").
157. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standards 9.32(i), 9.32(k).
158. See, e.g., In re Lamberis, 443 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ill. 1982); In re Garrett, 399 N.E.2d 369,
370 (Ind. 1980).
159. See, e.g., In re Loosemore, 771 N.E. 2d 1154, 1155-56 (Ind. 2002) (holding that
suspension for failure to pay attorney registration fees and failure to comply with legal education
requirements served to mitigate the lawyer's sanctioning for intentionally converting thousands of
dollars from clients.)
160. La. State Bar Ass'n v. Chatelain, 573 So. 2d 470, 471 n.2 (La. 1991).
161. See, e.g., Blair, 781 P.2d at 939-40.
162. See, e.g., id. at 940.
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of an interim suspension during a delay does not qualify as prejudice
this context, since such a diminished capacity exists in every instance
interim suspension. 163 In addition, delay as a mitigating factor will
given less weight if the court perceives that the lawyer had a part
causing the delay.' 64

in
of
be
in

11. Experience, or Lack Thereof
ABA Standard 9.22(i) (substantial experience in the practice of
law) is an aggravating factor.1 65 Standard 9.32(0 (inexperience in the
practice of law) is a mitigating factor. 66 Perhaps the most intuitive way
to reason these standards out is to say that the experienced lawyer should
have known better, while the inexperienced lawyer did not know any
better. However, for purposes of an examination of intentional
conversion, the lawyer's experience is mostly irrelevant to the question
of whether a lawyer should be disbarred. When it comes to dishonest
acts, whether a lawyer is experienced or not experienced has no real
bearing on the matter, since one should not need training in the practice
of law to know that dishonesty is wrong. 167 This has not stopped courts,
however, from holding
the existence of many years of experience
168
against a lawyer.
12. Factors not Considered by the ABA
There are some factors considered in mitigation by a few courts that
are not among those listed in the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions. One such factor is financial problems, which might be
lumped in with the personal and emotional problems listed above. As
with personal and emotional problems, some courts dismiss financial
problems out of hand, 69 while it has also been held that such a factor
only serves as mitigation if the financial difficulties "are extreme and
result from circumstances that are not reasonably foreseeable or that are

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See, e.g., In re Ford, 749 P.2d 1331, 1335-36 (Cal. 1988).
See, e.g., In re Juarez, 24 P.3d 1040, 1062 (Wash. 2001).
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.22(i).
See id.
at 9.32(f).
See, e.g., In re Thompson, 991 P.2d 820, 823 (Colo. 1999).
See, e.g., In re Cohn, 503 N.Y.S.2d 759, 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
See, e.g., Juarez, 24 P.3d at 1061.
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beyond the attorney's control.' 70 Little weight is given to the difficulties
7
if they were caused by the lawyer's own unwise spending practices.1 1
Another rarely cited mitigating factor is the motive behind the
complaint filed against the lawyer who has intentionally converted client
funds. 172 In the New York case of In re Albanese, the court held that the
appearance of a possible malevolent intent behind the filing of the
complaint was, while not dispositive, a factor in
considering whether the
73
lawyer deserved to be disbarred or suspended.
III. PROBLEMS
What are the purposes of lawyer discipline? Part of the answer to
that question depends on how disciplinary sanctions are characterized: as
sentences akin to criminal sanctions, 174 or as sanctions with their own
identity and individual purposes. 175 For those courts that view such
sanctions as analogous to criminal sanctions, there are generally three
purposes. 176 For starters, the sanctions are intended to punish the
177
wrongdoer to a degree that is appropriate to the offense committed.
Secondly, they are intended to protect the public, as both a specific
deterrent and a general deterrent.' 78 Lastly, disciplinary sanctions are
meant to reinforce the public's confidence in the legal system and its
ability to govern itself.' 79 Those courts that do not view disciplinary
sanctions as criminal deny any punitive purpose behind lawyer
sanctions, while agreeing that deterrence and preservation of the public's
confidence are crucial, and that sometimes rehabilitation comes into play
as a purpose when it comes to a case of a lawyer under the influence of a
physical or mental impairment.'8 0 All of these purposes can be folded
within the all-encompassing purpose of either protecting the public or
protecting the integrity of the legal system, where the ultimate goal of

170. In re Brown, 906 P.2d 1184, 1195 (Cal. 1995) (quoting In re Naney, 793 P.2d 54, 60 (Cal.
1990)).
171. See, e.g., id. (giving no weight to financial difficulties as mitigation where it was unclear
whether the lawyer's problems arose from changes in law that affected his law practice or from his
own fixation with his construction of a dream house).
172. See In re Albanese, 710 N.Y.S.2d 594, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582, 585 (Miss. 2000).
175. See, e.g., Exparte Thompson, 152 So. 229, 232 (Ala. 1933).
176. See, e.g., Cotton, 809 So. 2d at 585.
177. See, e.g., id.
178. See, e.g., id
179. See, e.g., id
180. See, e.g., In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 326 (D.C. 1987).
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both is to purge the legal system of those lawyers who
have done harm
8
to the system, and who might continue to do harm.' '
So with these purposes in mind, the key concern is whether the
system of lawyer sanctioning is properly constructed so as to ensure that
the public is adequately protected and that their confidence in the legal
system is maintained. The countervailing concern is that if the system
goes too far to ensure that every sanctioning body metes out a severe
enough sanction so as to definitively protect the public, the door could
be opened to the possibility that overly harsh sanctions are sometimes
handed down, which in and of itself diminishes the ability of the public
to maintain confidence in the system. The goal must be to find the
correct balance between those two concerns, while protection of the
public and the integrity of the legal system are achieved without
inflicting sanctions that are unfair and extreme.
A.

Too Discretionary

The ability to weigh mitigating factors in any trial determination
gives judges the discretion to hand down the decision they feel is most
appropriate, but is it possible to give judges too much discretion? When
examined in the context of satisfying particular sanctioning goals, it is
entirely possible. Various courts have either failed to come up with the
sanction that logically follows from their own reasoning,' 2 or they have
interpreted individual mitigating factors in a way that is inconsistent
83
with the stated sanctioning goals. 1
In the New York case In re Glazer, an attorney was found guilty of
intentionally misappropriating over $86,000, in order to help his own
law practice and his marriage.184 The attorney claimed the existence of
two mitigating factors: that he lacked a selfish motive because he
intended to pay the money back once his own problems were solved, and
85
that he did eventually pay the money back, thus making restitution.!
The court rightly dismissed both mitigating factor claims.' 86 The motive
to convert came from the attorney's original, intentional taking of the
money, and was not purged by any honorable future plans for that

181.
297 (La.
182.
183.
184.

See, e.g., Exparte Thompson, 152 So. 229, 232 (Ala. 1933); In re Hand, 787 So. 2d 294,
2001).
See generallyIn re Glazer, 641 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
See generally Miami County Bar Ass'n v. Hallows, 676 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio 1997).
See Glazer, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 6.

185.

See id.at 7.

186.

See id.
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money. 187 The court allowed for a lessening of the sanction from
disbarment to suspension if the attorney was careless or mistaken about
his right to the money, but noted that this was not such a case.' 88 In
response to the restitution claim, the court held that the ultimate
89
repayment of the money did not serve to excuse the wrongful conduct. 1
This was especially true in this case, where the attorney paid back the
money only after the complaint against him had been filed.' 90
How is it, then, that this court, after shooting down all of the
attorney's mitigating factor claims, recommended suspension rather than
disbarment, pending any future disciplinary findings?' 9' There are two
plausible explanations. First is the possibility that there is more to this
case than is present in the published opinion, a distinct possibility
considering the fact that many disciplinary hearings are held
confidentially. 192 Such confidentiality can sometimes serve to protect
lawyers from personal, embarrassing information being made public.
However, it also serves to completely undermine the sanctioning goal of
preserving the public's confidence in the legal system. The second
possibility is that this was a case of lawyers helping lawyers, where
professional empathy took precedence over a rightful sanction.' 93 If this
was the case here, then the court has virtually ignored the goals of
lawyer sanctioning in favor of maintaining a level of camaraderie within
the profession.
Those courts that have misapplied and misinterpreted mitigating
factors have subverted the goals of lawyer sanctioning in subtler fashion.
In Miami County Bar Association v. Hallows, an Ohio case, a lawyer
guilty of intentionally converting client funds was relieved of the
sanction of disbarment almost entirely because of his alcoholism. 194 The
problem with the court's reasoning was that it deemed the alcoholism a
mitigating factor simply by virtue of the fact that the lawyer was an
alcoholic, and that he had made a sincere attempt to overcome the
affliction.'

95

A sincere attempt to overcome alcoholism does not by itself serve
to satisfy the two goals of lawyer discipline. Unless the lawyer has
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id
See id.
See id.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 7-8.
See supra note 22.
See supra note 24.
See Miami County Bar Ass'n v. Hallows, 676 N.E.2d 517, 519 (Ohio 1997).
See id.
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actually succeeded in overcoming the disease to some degree that can
assure the public that he will not lose control in such a way again, the
public has not been properly protected by the sanction. Besides the fact
that disbarment keeps a wrongdoing lawyer away from the practice of
law for at least two years longer than a standard suspension, 196 it is more
difficult to become reinstated after disbarment than it is from
suspension, and the larger stigma of disbarment does a far more effective
job of communicating to the public that the legal system can police
itself. 197 It makes little sense for the court to give such a break to a
lawyer guilty of intentional conversion when the lawyer has done so
little to show that he has overcome the disease that ostensibly caused
him to commit the violation in the first place.
Similar misapplications and misinterpretations of mitigating factors
have occurred in other courtrooms. In the Georgia case, In re Freeman, a
lawyer intentionally misappropriated nearly $6,000, and was suspended
for ninety days rather than disbarred. 198 One claim that influenced this
court to go from a disbarment down to the short suspension was the
court's conclusion that the wrongdoing lawyer lacked a selfish motive,
because he gave the money he took from his client to his brother, who
was suffering financial problems. 199 Such a holding fails to further the
goal of protecting the public. The public is not protected if a lawyer gets
a break simply because he or she has put stolen client funds to honorable
use. The client is harmed regardless of what the lawyer ultimately does
with the taken money. Unlike an alcoholic who has recovered, there is
no assurance that the lawyer would not do the same thing all over again
once his ninety-day suspension expired, since he has proven himself to
be someone who would go to such lengths if the situation required it.
B. Too Draconian
Are the brighter line standards adopted by the Wilson and Addams
courts, 200 with their near-rejection of most every possible mitigating

factor in intentional misappropriation cases, too harsh? With the
existence of an infinite number of possible fact situations, it is important
that judges be provided some discretion in order to allow the breathing
196.

See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, R. 24 and R. 25

Commentary (1996).
197.

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 2.2 Commentary.

198. See In re Freeman, 506 S.E.2d 872, 874 (Ga. 1998).
199. See id. at 873.
200.

See generally In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979); In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190

(D.C. 1990).
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room for those situations where a lawyer guilty of intentional
misappropriation is indeed more deserving of suspension rather than
disbarment. Having said that, there are precious few areas where the
intentionally misappropriating lawyer is not given every possible benefit
of the doubt.
One of those areas where lawyers are sometimes given a raw deal is
that circumstance where the lawyer is mentally or physically impaired,
specifically when it comes to alcohol or drug addiction. The New Jersey
case In re Hein, a progeny of Wilson, goes to great lengths to explain
why alcoholism should not be considered a mitigating factor even when
the afflicted lawyer has shown a course of rehabilitation and recovery.2 °1
The court in that case addressed the situation of a lawyer who fully
recovers from alcoholism and thus will most certainly not intentionally
misappropriate client funds again, and noted that even though it was
troubling to disbar such a lawyer, disbarment was necessary to achieve
the two overriding goals of lawyer discipline. 0 2 However, if one accepts
the proposition that an alcoholic who misappropriates was acting under
the influence of a temporary affliction, and that this lawyer has removed
that affliction from his or her life, then the sanction of disbarment does
not serve to protect the public any more than a suspension would. There
is no specific deterrence value to the disbarment if the wrongdoing
lawyer has eliminated the only factor that led to the commission of the
violation. Such a lawyer would not repeat the offense regardless of the
sanction. It has also been argued, forcefully, that there is no general
deterrence value to such a sanction. 203
The Hein court's means of discounting the probability that the
protection of the public will not be served by disbarring a fully
recovered alcoholic, is to conclude that any lawyer sanctioned for
intentional misappropriation will likely never misappropriate again and
yet courts disbar them anyway, removing any reason to give recovered
alcoholics special treatment.20 4 That is an oddly hollow argument,
especially since there is data that speaks directly against it, indicating a
significant percentage of recidivism. 20 5 Regardless, this court put all of
201. See In re Hein, 516 A.2d 1105, 1107-08 (N.J. 1986).
202. See id. at 1108.
203. See, e.g., In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 327 (D.C. 1987) (noting that "[o]ther alcoholic
attorneys likely will fail to make the connection between the sanctioned attorney's alcoholic
condition and their own drinking problem, and between their own drinking and their professional
behavior").
204. See Hein, 516 A.2d at 1108.
205. See Levin, supra note 9, at 5 n.20 (stating that "27% of New Jersey lawyers who were
disciplined but not disbarred for stealing client money were found to have stolen again").
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its focus on the goal of preservation of public's confidence in the
integrity of the justice system, without being able to justify the sanction
through the more earthbound goal of protecting the public. That is a
dangerous road to travel. If the only goal of lawyer sanctioning was the
preservation of the public's confidence in a legal system that can police
itself, such a goal could justify the imposition of a great many overly
severe sanctions without the justification of protecting the public
required as well. Such a concern is all the more reason to search for a
balanced standard, where every sanctioning decision serves to further
both goals.
IV.

TOWARDS A LESS DISCRETIONARY STANDARD

While the Wilson court may have justified some severe and unfair
sanctioning by focusing entirely on the disciplinary goal of preserving
the public's confidence in the system, ignoring the goal of protecting the
public, 20 6 it is difficult to argue with its basic premise that there is
nothing worse than the theft of a client's money.0 7 Therefore, it is
important that judges have a more clearly defined standard to use when
determining the proper sanction for such an offense, one that allows
them room to avoid inappropriate harshness while at the same time
depriving them of the discretionary space that allows them to lighten the
sanction in just about any possible misappropriation case.
Before analyzing each of the mitigating factors within the context
of the two chief sanctioning goals, it is important to address the issue of
client injury. If the act of intentionally misappropriating client funds is
by itself the cardinal sin for a lawyer, then, according to the logic used
by the Wilson court, it should not matter how much money was taken.
Such an idea is rightfully unattractive to many, because the potential for
harshness becomes so large.20 8 The problem with so severe a rule is that,
besides the fact that from a punishment standpoint the sanction would
clearly not be in proportion to the violation, the goal of protecting the
public through deterrence by disbarring a lawyer who stole fifty dollars
instead of suspending him is an example of overkill in the extreme. A
suspension of up to three years should be plenty of deterrence for a
lawyer thinking of stealing so small an amount of money. Nor is the
206. See In re Wilson, 409 A.2d 1153, 1155 (N.J. 1979) (holding that "the principal reason for
discipline is to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity and trustworthiness of lawyers
in general," and that such a goal was controlling in misappropriation cases).
207. See id. at 457.
208. See Levin, supra note 9, at 30 (noting that "a rule requiring disbarment of all lawyers who
convert client funds would encompass the lawyer who took $50,000 or $50").
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public so bloodthirsty that it needs to see such a lawyer disbarred in
order to maintain its confidence in the system. Therefore, the courts
must have some discretion when it comes to this factor of the analysis. If
the court determines that the amount taken is sufficiently large that it
inflicted a significant injury on the client, then the degree of that injury
should be considered as aggravation, and if the degree of the injury is
small enough, it should be viewed as mitigation. The ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions have accounted for this by making the
analysis of the injury as well as the potential for injury a determination
apart from 209
the consideration of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.

In a Note calling for more disbarment, it is also important to
address the issue of temporary disbarment versus permanent disbarment.
According to a court in Nebraska, one of the few states where
disbarment is permanent,
[a] judgment of permanent disbarment is a most severe penalty, as
anyone who is dependent upon some special skill or knowledge for his
own livelihood will quickly recognize if he contemplates for a moment
the impact of being deprived by judicial fiat of the use of that skill and
knowledge. Disbarment ought not to be imposed for an isolated act
unless the act is of such210a nature that it is indicative of permanent
unfitness to practice law.
With such a consideration in mind, it would be more equitable if
those few states where disbarment is automatically permanent utilized a
test similar to that proposed in California in 1997, a test that would at
least give such courts the space to temporarily disbar the attorney if such
a sanction was more appropriate. 211
A.

Analyzing the Factors

Determining how effective the ABA's mitigating and aggravating
circumstances fit into the goals of lawyer sanctioning for intentional
misappropriation is the next step towards a less discretionary standard.
Since every sanction, by virtue of it being a sanction, serves to increase
the public's confidence in the system, the true test of a mitigating or
209. See ABA STANDARDS, supranote 10, at Standard 3.0 Commentary.
210. State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Cook, 232 N.W.2d 120, 132 (Neb. 1975).
211. See Tracy Genesen, Permanent Disbarment Sanction: The New Rule, LITIGATION (Los
Angeles County Bar Assoc., Los Angeles, CA), Summer 1997, at 2 (proposing a system where six
factors similar to those listed in the ABA Standards are weighed to consider the appropriateness of
temporary or permanent disbarment).
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aggravating factor's worthiness is whether it considers an issue that
relates to the protection of the public.
1. Prior record: Aggravating, But Not Mitigating
In order to advance the goal of protecting the public, a lawyer's
prior record should be considered as aggravating to a degree dependent
upon the factors listed in the Oregon test, 2 12 but the lack of any prior
record should not be viewed as mitigating in an intentional
misappropriation case. The presence of a sufficiently relevant prior
record makes sense as aggravation because a lawyer who was not
deterred by past sanctions has displayed a greater need for more severe
punishment in order to be properly deterred from committing the act
again. By the same token, a lawyer with a previously spotless record
who has intentionally misappropriated has illustrated, by virtue of
committing the egregious act itself, that he or she has not been deterred
by the threat of sanctioning. As has been noted by certain courts, the
absence of a prior record serves more as the cancellation of an
aggravating factor, rather than as a mitigating factor all on its own, and
213
should be treated neutrally, not as mitigation.
2. Selfish Motive: Aggravating, But Not Mitigating
A dishonest intent is established by the very act of conversion
itself,214 and so this factor generally does not come into play in
intentional misappropriation cases, except for the lawyer who has taken
the money as self-help. 2 15 Courts have ruled that a lawyer with a bona
fide claim to money has the right to appropriate it before the law has
actually given him that right,216 but those courts that have refused to
consider such a circumstance as mitigation are more in tune with the
concern of protecting the public.2 17 While a client who has no actual
right to certain funds is not injured by such conversion, there is a
potential danger in allowing a lawyer to make that determination on his
or her own, the potential of the lawyer being wrong, that is rightfully
considered by the ABA Standards as equal to actual harm.218 What
exactly is the lack of selfish motive, in the context of an intentional
212. See In re Jones, 951 P.2d 149, 152 (Or. 1997).
213. See, e.g., Cotton v. Miss. Bar, 809 So. 2d 582, 587 (Miss. 2000).
214. See, e.g., In re Rivera, 654 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
215. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Sheridan, 741 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md.
1999); In re Young, 488 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Il. 1986); see also supra text accompanying note 104.
216. See, e.g., Sheridan, 741 A.2dat 1161.
217. See, e.g., Young, 488 N.E.2d at 1017.
218. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 3.0(c).
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misappropriation? Should the lawyer who steals in order to donate to
charity be given a lighter sentence than the lawyer who steals in order to
buy a yacht? When it comes to protecting clients from lawyer theft, and
even when it comes to preserving the public's confidence in the system,
there is no practical difference between the two. Theft, by definition, is
selfish, and should always be considered as aggravation no matter the
lawyer's intent for the stolen property.
3. Cooperation: Aggravating and Mitigating
Cooperation with the authorities in disciplinary matters is one
factor the ABA seems to have gotten right. Because the achievement of
justice is important both towards protecting the public and preserving the
public's confidence in the system, it is entirely sensible to give a lawyer
charged with intentional misappropriation credit for fully cooperating
with the proceedings, and to hold it against the lawyer who obstructs
those proceedings. While cooperation should never be enough on its
own to mitigate a sanction down to suspension, it should be a
consideration, in order to make sure that lawyers have every incentive to
promote an accurate result, and every disincentive to obstruct the march
towards that objective.
4. Physical and Mental Impairments: Mitigating
When it comes to physical or mental impairments, it is vital that the
test laid out by the 1992 version of the ABA Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions be followed,2t 9 in order to ensure that if such a factor
is treated as mitigation the public is still getting the full measure of
protection. That means the lawyer must essentially show that he or she
was a fundamentally different person while committing the
misappropriation. Such a showing requires proof that the lawyer had the
affliction, that the lawyer sought out treatment for the affliction, and that
the lawyer has fully recovered from the affliction. Courts have been
rightfully strict when it comes to making sure that the lawyer has truly
recovered from the problem, sometimes even requiring that a period of
probation be tacked onto the suspension. ° If the lawyer was under the
influence of a problem that no longer exists, the public can be assured of
protection when such a lawyer is allowed back into the profession.
This issue gets quite a bit more complicated when a lawyer claims
to have been under the influence of personal, emotional, or financial
1

219.
220.

See ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.32(i) (Supp. 1992).
See, e.g., In re Ewaniszyk, 788 P.2d 690, 696 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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problems while committing the conversion. While there is always the
threat of relapse after a recovery from a physical or mental addiction or
impairment, the lawyer who has stolen client funds while under more
personal pressures will have a far harder time showing a full "recovery"
from such pressure. Without such recovery, the chance of that lawyer
committing the same violation for similar reasons remains. Such a
lawyer has shown a propensity to steal from a client, and because
personal and financial problems are more commonplace and should be
more manageable in the daily lives of lawyers, in most cases nothing can
be proven that will show a removal of that propensity.
5. Restitution: Aggravating But Not Mitigating
While the ABA endorses restitution as a mitigating factor when
made in a timely fashion,22 1 the Wilson court's complete dismissal of
restitution as mitigation is more consistent with sanctioning goals.222 As
that court noted, restitution is often used to contend that the lawyer
intended to borrow the money rather than steal it, a contention that
communicates the idea that borrowing client money is somehow
appropriate.223 Giving restitution mitigating weight, even when the
money is paid back before a complaint has been filed, communicates the
message to lawyers that taking money from clients will get them the
lighter sanction of suspension if they pay it back in the future (and get
caught doing so). The problem, as noted in Wilson, is that lawyers often
fail to receive the money they planned to pay back their "loan," and so
they end up robbing Peter to pay Paul, and potential injury turns into
actual injury.2 24 Therefore, giving lawyers sanctioning breaks for paying
back money they had no right to take in the first place gives lawyers, in
certain situations, extra incentive to "borrow" a client's money. While
one could argue that removing restitution as a mitigating factor will
remove the incentive of the lawyer to pay back the client, thus adding
harm to the client, such a fear should be assuaged by preserving the
failure to make restitution as an aggravating factor.
6. Vulnerability: Aggravating
The issue of client vulnerability, which exists only on the side of
aggravation, should not just be maintained as an aggravating factor, but
courts should give it more attention than they currently do. A public
221.
222.
223.
224.

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Standard 9.32 Commentary.
See ln re Wilson, 409A.2d 1153, 1156 (N.J. 1979).
See id. at 458.
See id. at 458-59.
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unschooled in the law is vulnerable enough already to lawyers with the
predilection to steal from them, and those with added helplessness
require added deterrent protection.
7. Remorse: Aggravating But Not Mitigating
Remorse is a tricky subject, because it is so difficult to measure its
sincerity. Remorse could have legitimacy as a mitigating factor if truly
sincere, since such sincerity would indicate that the lawyer would be less
likely to repeat the violation, thus rewarding the lawyer who indicated a
likelihood of being specifically deterred. Besides the impossibility of
determining sincerity, it would be difficult to attribute very much weight
to such a mitigating factor even if the expression was sincere, since the
mere stress of getting caught could generate such sincere expressions of
remorse. Far more telling is a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor,
since such a lacking would clearly indicate the inability of the lawyer to
accept that he or she had done wrong, thus increasing the likelihood of
recidivism.
8. Single Act or Multiplicity of Acts: Aggravating But Not
Mitigating
Because the violation of intentional misappropriation is as serious
as it is, it is entirely unclear why a lawyer should get a break for
misappropriating client funds through a single thieving act rather than
through a multiplicity of acts. While a series of acts stretched over a
period of time illustrates a more calculated intent on the part of the
intentionally misappropriating lawyer and thus makes a lawyer more
dangerous to the public, a single act does not necessarily illustrate the
lack of calculation. This is another factor that makes much more sense as
aggravation rather than as mitigation.
9. Character: Not Mitigating
Character evidence is the most open-ended mitigating factor on the
list, a vaguely defined catch-all for disciplinary boards and judges who
might want to help out a fellow lawyer. While some courts take the
factor seriously, restricting that which constitutes credible character
evidence, 2 5 there are others that will use it as the court did in the
aforementioned Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Harris,where the lawyer who
225.

See, e.g., In re Rotman, 556 N.E.2d 243, 251 (Ill. 1990) (giving little credence to the fact

that the wrongdoing lawyer was hired by a respectable law firm and a prestigious family after the
disciplinary proceeding began, because the lawyer never informed the law firm or the family of the

pending discipline).
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stole from an institutionalized client escaped disbarment by virtue of
being a discharged veteran and a churchgoer.2 26 Even for those courts
that strictly scrutinize the character evidence, it is difficult for such
evidence to carry any relevance to the act of intentional
misappropriation. Such an act requires secrecy and concealment by its
very nature, and if the lawyer has already been shown to have committed
the violation of intentional conversion once, it is basically impossible for
any character evidence to indicate that the lawyer had not committed
similar acts before, or to indicate that the lawyer will not commit such an
act again in the future.
10. Other Penalties and Delay: Mitigating
The imposition of other penalties and a delay in the proceedings are
far more viable as mitigating factors, because both are concerned with
the lawyer getting as just and fair a proceeding as possible. If a delay in
the proceeding hurt a lawyer's opportunity to put on his or her best case,
the public is not given any more protection by ignoring such prejudice,
nor is confidence in the legal system increased, or even maintained. The
public is also not entitled to nor legitimately protected by a lawyer
receiving more penalty than is deserved, and so any previous sanctioning
for the same misconduct should be considered.
11. Experience: Not Aggravating and Not Mitigating
While an abundance of experience is considered to be an
aggravating factor, and a lack of experience is treated as a mitigating
factor, neither one has any relevance to the goals of lawyer sanctioning
in an intentional misappropriation case. A lawyer with little experience
is no less likely to repeat the offense than a lawyer with much
experience, because the violation of conversion is so clearly wrong that
it is practically impossible to say that the lawyer with little experience
did not know any better. As was noted in the Colorado case In re
Thompson, "[i]nexperience in the practice of law is of little or no
importance as a mitigating factor when the lawyer's conduct is
dishonest., 227 The protection of the public is no better served by giving
breaks to stealing lawyers with no experience in the law. By the same
token, it is equally difficult to claim that the lawyer with much
experience should have had significantly greater reason to know that

226. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Harris, 772 N.E.2d 621, 623 (Ohio 2002).
227. In re Thompson, 991 P.2d 820, 823 (Colo. 1999).
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stealing from a client was wrong, and thus protection of the public is
also not furthered by making such a circumstance an aggravating factor.
12. Factors Not Previously Considered
The test for any factor presented to the courts not listed in the ABA
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and not considered previously
should be the same as that applied to the above factors. If the presence of
the factor makes it less likely that the public's confidence in the system
will be decreased, or that the wrongdoing lawyer will repeat similar
misconduct, and thus the protection of the public is advanced, then such
a factor should mitigate. If the presence of the factor makes it more
likely that the public's confidence in the system will be decreased by
slack sanctioning, if the factor represents an even greater attack on the
public by the violation at issue, or if the presence of the factor would
create a decrease in general deterrence should slack sanctioning result,
then that factor should be treated as aggravation.
B.

Weighing the Factors

It is worth repeating the concept articulated in In re Buckalew, that
"[t]here is no 'magic formula' to determine which or how many
mitigating circumstances justify the reduction of an otherwise
appropriate sanction. Each case presents different circumstances which
must be weighed against the nature and gravity of the lawyer's
misconduct., 228 When the violation is as serious as intentional
conversion, such a weighing should become a little more clear cut.
Mitigating and aggravating factors are discretionary tools by definition,
and so it must be left up to the courts to utilize them, although the
overall balancing test can be more strictly defined. Because intentional
misappropriation is so serious an offense, because clients are so helpless
to lawyers put in charge of their money, the protection of the public and
preservation of the public's confidence in the system requires the
adoption of the test formulated by the Addams court. 229 Recognizing the
.potential for unfairness while at the same maintaining a strict view of the
violation, that court held that in order to lessen the sanction from
disbarment to suspension, the mitigating factors must outweigh the
aggravating factors to a substantialdegree. 230 The concern expressed by
228. In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 54 (Alaska 1986); see also supra text accompanying note
84.
229. See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190,191 (D.C. 1990).
230. See id. at 195.
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Judge Ferren in his concurrence in Addams that such a balancing test is
no balancing test at all is unfounded. 3 It is entirely possible for a
mitigating factor such as recovery from alcoholism or even a negligible
client injury to substantially outweigh an aggravating factor such as
client vulnerability, since a strong case could be made by the
wrongdoing lawyer that what motivated the violation was the
alcoholism, now eliminated, and not the vulnerability of the client. What
is important is that the courts in intentional misappropriation cases be
given some limits as to how far they can stretch mitigating factor
consideration in order to reach the result they want, so that the two
overriding goals of lawyer sanctioning are maintained.
V.

CONCLUSION

In these post-Enron days, where countless innocent people have
been destroyed by violations of fiduciary duties related to the handling
of money, it is all the more important that the legal system take the
necessary steps to make sure the public is protected from such egregious
breaches of fiduciary duties by lawyers, and to do everything within
reason to give the public confidence that the legal system has the
integrity to function properly. It is therefore of the utmost importance
that the system furthers the deterrence of lawyers who might be inclined
to commit acts of intentional misappropriation of client funds, while
working towards the incapacitation of lawyers who have already done
so. As it exists now, the national disciplinary system is generally illequipped to treat this violation with the stringency it deserves, producing
woefully inconsistent results between the states and within individual
jurisdictions. Too many courts have too many mitigating factor
considerations at their fingertips that allow them the discretion to save
virtually any lawyer from disbarment that they wish, regardless of the
merits of the case.
A paring down of such factors is in order for intentional
misappropriation cases, along with a reformulation of the balancing
between mitigating and aggravating factors. Those mitigating factors
that should be maintained in such a scheme are the consideration of any
mental of physical impairments that influenced the lawyer at the time of
the violation but have since been eliminated, along with those factors,
such as delay in proceedings or a full cooperation in those proceedings,
that relate to the court's ability to reach an accurate and just decision.

231.

Seeid.at201.
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All those factors relating to the lawyer's character or experience
prior to the misconduct should be discarded, because conversion is so
egregious that such factors say preciously little about the lawyer's
propensity to convert again in light of the fact that the lawyer converted
already. Those mitigating factors that are maintained should
substantially outweigh any aggravating factors, in order to make sure
that if the court is going to merely suspend a lawyer who has
intentionally taken money from a client, it is because there is every
reason to believe, from the perspective of the court and the public, that
such an act by that lawyer will never happen again.
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